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Background. Paranoia involves thoughts and beliefs about the harmful intent of others but the social consequences have
been much less studied. We investigated whether paranoia predicts maladaptive social behaviour in terms of cooperative
and punitive behaviour using experimental game theory paradigms, and examined whether reduced cooperation is best
explained in terms of distrust as previous studies have claimed.
Methods. We recruited a large population sample (N = 2132) online. All participants completed the Green et al. Paranoid
Thoughts Scale and (i) a Dictator Game and (ii) an Ultimatum Game, the former with an option for costly punishment.
Following distrust-based accounts, we predicted highly paranoid people would make higher offers when the outcome
depended on receiving a positive response from their partner (Ultimatum Game) but no difference when the partner’s
response was irrelevant (Dictator Game). We also predicted paranoia would increase punitive responses. Predictions
were pre-registered in advance of data collection. Data and materials are open access.
Results. Highly paranoid participants actually made lower offers than non-paranoid participants both in the Dictator
Game and in the Ultimatum Game. Paranoia positively predicted punitive responses.
Conclusions. These ﬁndings suggest that distrust is not the best explanation for reduced cooperation in paranoia and
alternative explanations, such as increased self-interest, may apply. However, the tendency to attribute harmful intent
to partners was important in motivating punitive responses. These results highlight differing motivations underlying
adverse social behaviour in paranoia and suggest that accounts based solely on the presenting features of paranoia
may need to be rethought.
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Introduction
Paranoia lies on a continuum, ranging from low-level
paranoid thoughts to frank paranoid delusions that
centre on concerns about others’ harmful intent
(Freeman & Garety, 2000). Paranoia has typically
been investigated using psychometric measures or
tests that measure cognitive biases, reﬂecting the com-
mon focus on individualistic processes involved in
evaluating personal threat (Freeman & Garety, 2014).
However, relatively little research has explored social
interaction despite adverse social behaviour being a
common characteristic of paranoia (Freeman, 2016).
Paranoia strongly relates to processes involved in
social decision-making and cooperation (Boyer et al.
2015; Patrzyk & Takáč, 2017) and there is now a
nascent literature investigating paranoia using game
theoretic paradigms. These paradigms involve social
interactions where cooperative or non-cooperative
decisions determine each participant’s economic pay-
off (Camerer, 2003). These tasks are particularly rele-
vant to paranoid concerns because they allow for
cooperation and mutual beneﬁt but also allow for
harm, in the form of economic costs, and cheating,
by gaining resources at the expense of the partner.
These approaches therefore have the potential to reveal
how paranoia affects social behaviour, and – because
they are designed to selectively isolate speciﬁc social
motivations – can help test and develop psychological
theories.
Paranoia and cooperative behaviour
Previous game theory studies report that paranoia
predicts reduced cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game (Ellett et al. 2013) and reduced invest-
ments in the Trust Game (Fett et al. 2012, 2016;
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Gromann et al. 2013). These ﬁndings were interpreted
as due to increased levels of ‘distrust’ in paranoia.
Nevertheless, alternative explanations for reduced
cooperation are possible. Reduced cooperation could
reﬂect doubts about the partner’s competence rather
than fears about their intentions. Alternatively, it
might stem from players’ increased desire to maximise
their own payoffs (hereafter ‘self-interest’, used in
the non-pejorative economic sense) since, in both the
one shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Trust Games the
individually payoff-maximising option is to defect
(choose the non-cooperative option), regardless of
how the partner behaves. To disentangle these
motives, a comparison with a situation where the per-
sonal incentive to defect is still the same but where the
partner’s response is irrelevant in deciding payoffs is
needed. In these so-called ‘non-strategic’ scenarios,
where the partner’s response is not a concern, self-
interest rather than distrust is a more parsimonious
explanation for reduced cooperation.
To test whether paranoia predicts reduced coopera-
tive behaviour in the presence and absence of strategic
concerns, we recruited participants to play the Dictator
Game (Kahneman et al. 1986) and the Ultimatum
Game (Güth et al. 1982). The Dictator Game is a non-
strategic game where the ‘dictator’ decides how to
split a pot of money with their partner (the ‘receiver’)
who must accept any donation. Dictator donations
therefore represent a relatively unbiased estimate of
cooperative tendency in the absence of strategic con-
cerns. In contrast, the Ultimatum Game is a strategic
scenario where the responder decides whether to
accept the proposer’s offer – in which case both players
are paid according to the proposed split, or can reject
the offer – meaning neither player receives any
money. To ensure a payoff, the proposer needs to
judge what is likely to be an acceptable offer to the
responder. These games provide a helpful contrast,
allowing a test of how social decision-making differs
in paranoia between two similar scenarios that vary
only in whether one player needs to take into account
the other’s intentions when making a decision.
The Ultimatum Game also offers another method to
disambiguate whether reduced cooperation stems
from self-interest or distrust in a manner that is not
possible in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (where
defecting could reﬂect either motive). Ultimatum
Game rejections to unfair offers impose greater costs
on the proposer than the responder, and leave open
the possibility that the responder could be motivated
by intent to harm the proposer. Indeed, previous
research has shown that a perception that the
responder will reject offers leads to more generous
proposals (Slembeck, 1999). If reduced cooperation
in paranoia stems from over-attributing harmful
intentions (thereby reducing trust), we would expect
paranoid participants to make more generous offers
as proposers in the Ultimatum Game in order to coun-
ter what they perceive as higher levels of harmful
intent in the responders. By contrast, if Ultimatum
Game offers only reﬂect self-interest (i.e. where partici-
pants offer the lowest amount they expect the partner
to accept), then we would not expect Ultimatum
Game offers to vary with paranoia.
Paranoia and punitive behaviour
Paranoid attributions of harmful intent should not only
manifest in reduced cooperation but also increased
punitive behaviour. Punishment occurs when one indi-
vidual pays a cost to impose a reciprocal cost on a
cheating partner (Raihani et al. 2012). Previous research
has established that decisions to take punitive action
involve a judgement of the severity of harm as well
as a judgment of whether the harm was intended
(Carlsmith et al. 2002; Cushman et al. 2009). A recent
study conﬁrmed that paranoia leads to increased levels
of harmful intent attribution to partners in the Dictator
Game where the actual motivation underlying dictator
decisions is ambiguous (Raihani & Bell, 2017a).
Therefore in this study, we expected these paranoid
attributions to manifest behaviourally – by predicting
an increased willingness to punish. We tested this pre-
diction using two behavioural measures. In the
Dictator Game, we introduced an unannounced oppor-
tunity for receivers to pay a small amount to impose a
larger ﬁne on the dictator after the dictator’s decision.
In the Ultimatum Game, rejecting offers can be inter-
preted as costly punishment since it involves incurring
a cost to impose a larger cost on an unfair partner
(Slembeck, 1999; but see Yamagishi et al. 2009). As
such, we predicted paranoia would also predict
increased rejection of Ultimatum Game offers.
Study aims summary
We predicted highly paranoid people would make
higher offers when the ﬁnal outcome depended on
a positive response from their partner (in the
Ultimatum Game) but no difference when they
believed that the partner’s response was irrelevant (in
the Dictator Game). We also predicted paranoia
would increase punitive responses in the Dictator
Game and rejections in the Ultimatum Game.
In contrast to studies which have recruited clinical
participants with psychiatric diagnoses but have rela-
tively low statistical power, we recruited a large sam-
ple that naturally includes people in the clinical
range (Shapiro et al. 2013) and tested these predictions
using analyses, which we pre-registered prior to col-
lecting data.
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Methods
Participants
This project was approved by the UCL Ethics Board
(project 3720/001). Participation was voluntary and
informed consent was obtained from all participants
prior to taking part.
We recruited 3217 US-based participants to complete
the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green
et al. 2008) via the online crowdsourcing platform
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, http://www.
mturk.com). GPTS responses were collected in
November–December 2016. Participants played two
Dictator Games without punishment (Raihani & Bell,
2017a) in December 2016. These data were published
in Raihani & Bell (2017a) and are not presented here.
We successfully recalled 2132 (979 males; 1153 females)
of the original 3217 participants in January–February
2017 to take part in the present study. Participants ran-
ged in age from 18 to 80 years old (mean: 38.0 ± 0.26).
Paranoia scores were unavailable for 11 participants,
because the worker ID entered did not match any of
the worker IDs in our existing database. Of the 2120
participants for whom we had paranoia scores, the
mean score was 50.7 ± 0.49 (range: 32–160), compared
with a mean of 48.8 ± 1.00 from the non-clinical sample
in the original Green et al. (2008) study. The mean
GPTS score for clinical patients with paranoid delu-
sions in original study was 101.9; in our sample 108
participants (5%) scored above the Green et al. clinical
mean (compared with 3% of non-clinical participants
in the original Green et al. study).
Data were collected in two waves with a 15-day
interval to reduce interference between tasks. In each
wave, participants played both the Dictator Game
and the Ultimatum Game (game order presentation
was counter-balanced via random assignment across
participants). In one wave, participants played as
both the Dictator Game dictator and the Ultimatum
Game proposer, while in the other wave they played
as the Dictator Game receiver and the Ultimatum
Game responder (see description below). The order
in which participants were recruited to waves of the
study was also counter-balanced. In each wave, parti-
cipants received a payment of $0.20 for taking part,
plus up to $1.10 depending on the outcome of the
games. In total 1187 of the recalled participants took
part in just one wave of the study, while 945 were suc-
cessfully recruited to both waves.
The experiment
In each wave, participants were truthfully informed
that they would be assigned two different partners
for each task, to reduce the potential for reciprocity
or retaliation across the tasks. Most participants
reported being conﬁdent or highly conﬁdent that
they were interacting with a real partner (see online
Supplementary Information). Participants made their
decisions in isolation and partners were subsequently
assigned via ex-post matching (c.f. Raihani et al.
2013). Using this method, decisions are stored and
retrieved when the matched partner participates, and
so although they involve genuine interaction, they do
not occur in real time. Participants were required to
correctly answer multiple-choice comprehension ques-
tions to ensure that they understood the contingencies
of the different tasks (see online Supplementary
Information for game instructions). Participants that
failed a multiple-choice comprehension question were
given a second attempt to answer correctly (using a
free-form answer so that they could not select the cor-
rect option via trial and error). Participants who still
answered incorrectly (46/1522, 3.0%, in the Dictator
Game and 88/1544, 5.7%, in the Ultimatum Game
answered at least one question incorrectly) could par-
ticipate but we include incomprehension as a variable
in analyses.
In the Dictator Game, participants were cast as either
the dictator (in one wave) or the receiver (in the other
wave). Note that loaded terms such as dictator and
receiver were not used in the instructions seen by par-
ticipants. Dictators were given $0.55 and informed that
the receiver had been given $0.05. Dictators could then
choose to send any division (from $0.00 to $0.55, in
$0.05 increments) to the receiver. Importantly, dictators
were not aware of the possibility that they could be
punished until after they had made their donation.
This was essential because we wished to collect a
measure of generosity that was unbiased by strategic
considerations. Receivers were informed of the starting
bonuses of both players and the fact that the dictator
could choose how much of a $0.55 starting bonus to
send to them. Receivers could sacriﬁce $0.05 of their
bonus to punish the dictator, by subtracting $0.15
from the dictator’s bonus. Using the strategy method,
receivers stated what donations from the dictator
(from $0.00 to $0.55) they would punish – and were
told that their decision would be executed based on
the actual donation decision of the dictator. Previous
studies have shown that this method is a reliable tech-
nique for eliciting behavioural responses in similar
tasks (Brandts & Charness, 2011; Fischbacher et al.
2012), although it might yield conservative estimates
of punitive tendency (Brandts & Charness, 2011).
In the Ultimatum Game, participants played as pro-
posers in one wave and in responders in the other
wave. Proposers were given $0.50 and instructed to
offer any share of this endowment (from $0.00 to
$0.50, in $0.05 increments) to the responder. Proposers
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were also informed that the responder had veto power
over the division, such that if the responder rejected
the offer then both players would get nothing.
Responders were instructed to indicate which offers
they would accept and which they would reject,
using the strategy method as above. In doing so, we
determined the responder’s minimum acceptable
offer (MAO). Responders were informed that their
decision to accept or reject the proposer’s offer would
be implemented based on their MAO.
Predictions
We speciﬁed eight a priori predictions, which were pre-
registered before data collection on AsPredicted.org –
https://aspredicted.org/mc5vz.pdf – and are included
in the online Supplementary Information. We report
one deviation for all analyses from the pre-registered
analysis and two deviations related to data coding.
The overall deviation was to include ‘failed compre-
hension’ as an explanatory variable in all models.
Originally, we intended to exclude participants who
failed comprehension checks but, to reduce the possi-
bility of systematic bias from excluding participants,
we used responses from all participants and controlled
for the effect of failing at least one comprehension
question in the analyses. All models were checked for
robustness when failed comprehenders were excluded
and discrepancies between the two approaches are
reported.
Data coding deviations relate to the analyses for pre-
dictions 6 and 7 below and were due to non-monotonic
strategies in the reported MAOs and punishment
thresholds for some participants (N = 72/1551 in
Ultimatum Game and 104/1551 in Dictator Game).
Participants could display a non-monotonic strategy
by, for example, stating that they would accept a propo-
ser’s offer of $0.20 but reject an offer of $0.50. Similarly, a
non-monotonic punishment strategy would be implied
if participants said they would punish a dictator dona-
tion of $0.20 but not $0.15. Non-monotonic MAOs in
the Ultimatum Game can reﬂect advantageous inequity
aversion (Brosnan & deWaal, 2014), though other expla-
nations are also possible (e.g. Hennig-Schmidt et al.
2008). Since we did not anticipate non-monotonic strat-
egies, we decided that a more conservative approach for
P6 and P7 would be to assess whether participants
rejected any non-zero proposer offer or punished any
dictator donation (rather than analysing responses to
all offers as originally envisaged).
P1: Dictator Game donations will be lower than
Ultimatum Game offers
To check the pattern of results in the whole sample
matched established ﬁndings (Camerer, 2003), we ran
a paired, two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test compar-
ing Dictator Game donations with Ultimatum Game
offers. N = 1529 participants.
P2 & P3: Dictator donations will not vary with
paranoia but Ultimatum Game offers will increase
with paranoia
We ran two models, one with Dictator Game donation
as the response term and one with Ultimatum Game
offer as the response term. These response terms
were each parameterised as a 7-level ordered categor-
ical response term in two cumulative link models
(CLM, package: ordinal; Christensen, 2015), with the
terms ‘Age’, ‘Paranoia’, ‘Order’ (0 = played as DG dic-
tator ﬁrst; 1 = played as UG proposer ﬁrst), ‘Failed
Comprehension’ (0 = no comprehension questions
wrong; 1 = at least 1 comprehension question wrong),
‘Gender’ (0 = female; 1 =male) and ‘Wave’ (1/2) set as
potential explanatory terms. These response terms
were included in all statistical models. Data were miss-
ing for seven participants, so both models are based on
N = 1522.
P4: Paranoia will be inversely associated with
Dictator Game punishment threshold
Punishment threshold was deﬁned as the highest dic-
tator donation that the participant said they would
punish. We had responses from 1544 participants. Of
these, 859 participants who did not punish any dona-
tion were excluded, leaving 685 responses for analysis.
As above, punishment threshold was a 7-level ordered
categorical variable, with higher values indicating
increased punitive tendency (i.e. a lower punishment
threshold). We used a CLM to investigate the factors
explaining the punishment threshold.
P5: Paranoia will be associated with higher MAO in
the Ultimatum Game
The MAO was speciﬁed as the minimum offer that a
responder said they would accept in the Ultimatum
Game. MAO was a 7-level ordered categorical variable
and was set as the response term in a CLM. N = 1544
responses.
P6: Paranoia will be positively associated with
willingness to punish at least one dictator donation
Willingness to punish was a dummy variable where
0 = would not punish any dictator donation and 1 =
would punish at least one dictator donation. This
dummy variable was set as the response term in a
Generalised Linear Model (GLM) with binomial error
structure. N = 1544 responses.
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P7: Paranoia will be positively associated with
tendency to reject at least one Ultimatum Game offer
We speciﬁed whether participants accepted all offers
(=0) or rejected at least one offer in the Ultimatum
Game (=1) and set this dummy variable as the response
term in a GLM with binomial error structure. N = 1544
responses.
P8: We do not know whether participants will be
more willing to reject Ultimatum Game offers than
they are to punish Dictator Game donations
To test whether the Ultimatum Game rejection thresh-
old (deﬁned as MAO – $0.05) was signiﬁcantly differ-
ent to the Dictator Game punishment threshold, we
ﬁrst converted these threshold amounts into propor-
tions of the total stake, to account for the different
stake sizes across the tasks ($0.55 and $0.50 in the
Dictator and Ultimatum Game, respectively). We
then ran a paired Wilcoxon signed rank test to see
whether participants showed different thresholds for
rejecting (Ultimatum Game) or punishing (Dictator
Game) offers, respectively. This test is based on all
638 cases for participants who indicated that they
would punish a Dictator Game donation and reject
an Ultimatum Game offer.
Statistical approach
We used multi-model selection with model averaging
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Grueber et al. 2011) to
compare the explanatory power of different input vari-
ables. Continuous input variables were standardised
(Gelman, 2008) and binary input variables were
centred, so estimates can be considered on the same
scale. Under this approach, we ﬁrst specify a global
model, containing all ﬁxed effects and interactions
that were speciﬁed in the pre-registered predictions.
All possible models deriving from this global model
are compared, resulting in a top model set, which con-
tains all the models that are within 2 AICc units of the
‘best’ model (that with the lowest AICc value).
Parameter estimates are obtained by averaging across
this top model set. This approach therefore incorpo-
rates the uncertainty over the true parameter estimate
when many models have similar levels of support.
All estimates reported here are full model averages,
which provide conservative estimates for terms that
are not included in all the top models. All data and
code are available at Raihani & Bell (2017b) https://
ﬁgshare.com/s/c5bbc8330551b14bc91e.
Unplanned analysis
We report one unplanned analysis, motivated by com-
ments from an anonymous reviewer, to establish
whether the effect of paranoia on punishment decision
in the Dictator Game was mediated by the partici-
pant’s tendency to attribute harmful intentions. This
was achieved by identifying participants who had par-
ticipated in a previous Dictator Game reported in
Raihani & Bell (2017a) where harmful intent attribu-
tions were recorded. See online Supplementary
Information for full details.
Results
Supported predictions
P1: Dictator Game donations will be lower than Ultimatum
Game offers
The mean dictator donation was $0.13 ± 0.00, com-
pared with a mean Ultimatum Game offer of $0.21 ±
0.00. Thus, dictator donations were signiﬁcantly
lower than Ultimatum Game offers, as predicted (Wil-
coxon signed rank test, V = 353 700, p < 0.001; Fig. 1a).
P4: Paranoia will be inversely associated with Dictator
Game punishment threshold
A total of 685/1544 (44.4%) receivers chose to punish at
least one dictator donation. The mean threshold below
which dictator donations were punished was $0.18 ±
0.01 (i.e. ∼33% of the stake). As predicted, paranoia
resulted in lower punishment thresholds [estimate:
−0.86, conﬁdence interval (CI) −1.16 to −0.57; Table 1;
Fig. 1b]. Women also had lower punishment thresholds
than men and threshold decreased with age (Table 1).
There were no meaningful effects of game order or
wave on punishment thresholds, although we did
ﬁnd that failing comprehension checks was associated
with a lowered punishment threshold (Table 1).
Excluding failed comprehenders (n = 66; 9.6%) does
not qualitatively change the results.
P5: Paranoia will be associated with higher MAO in the
Ultimatum Game
The mean MAO was $0.12 ± 0.00 (i.e. 24% of stake).
Paranoia was associated with marginally higher
MAO (estimate: 0.15; Fig. 1b), though the CIs asso-
ciated with this estimate include zero (CI −0.07 to
0.37). Men demanded higher shares of the stake
than women, as did participants that played the
Ultimatum Game before the Dictator Game (Table 2).
There were no meaningful effects of age or wave on
MAO. Finally, failed comprehenders (n = 88, 5.7%)
had lower MAOs than those who passed all compre-
hension checks. When failed comprehenders are
excluded, then we detect a robust positive effect of
paranoia on MAO (estimate: 0.22; CI 0.04–0.41).
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P6: Paranoia will be positively associated with willingness
to punish at least one Dictator Game donation
Paranoia was positively associated with willingness
to punish at least one dictator donation (estimate:
0.48, CI 0.27–0.70; online Supplementary Table S1).
Furthermore, punishment was more common
among males (estimate: 0.38; CI 0.16–0.59), among par-
ticipants who failed comprehension check(s) (estimate:
1.38, CI 0.87–1.90), and among participants who
played in the role of Ultimatum Game responder
before they made their punishment decision in the
Dictator Game (estimate: 0.62, CI 0.41–0.83). We
detected no meaningful effects of age or wave on the
willingness to punish (online Supplementary
Table S1). Excluding participants who failed compre-
hension checks does not qualitatively change these
results.
Unsupported predictions
P2: Dictator Game donations will not vary with paranoia
Paranoia had a negative effect on dictator donations
(estimate: −0.29, CI −0.49 to −0.10; Fig. 1a). In add-
ition, male dictators made lower donations than
females (estimate: −0.37, CI −0.56 to −0.18; Table 3).
Older participants and those that played the Dictator
Game before the Ultimatum Game made higher
donations (Table 3). In a separate, unregistered ana-
lysis, we found a positive effect of paranoia on the
tendency to fail at least one comprehension check
(GLM, estimate = 0.02, CI 0.00–0.03). Thus, the negative
effect of paranoia on dictator donations emerges
even though failed comprehenders were more – not
less – generous in the task. Excluding failed compre-
henders from analyses does not change these results
qualitatively.
Fig. 1. Effect of paranoia on (a) DG and UG offers made and (b) amount offered that the subject rejected (UG) or punished
(DG). DG donations are shown in black and UG offers are shown in red. Data are raw means and standard errors and do not
control for other terms included in the statistical models. Where no standard error bars are shown, this is because the
standard error of the mean was 0.00 when rounded. For visualisation (and to calculate the raw means) paranoia was
converted to a 5-level categorical variable, where 14 35, 35 < 24 60, 60 < 3485, 85 < 44 110, and 110 < 54 160.
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P3: Ultimatum Game offers will increase with paranoia
Paranoid participants made lower Ultimatum Game
offers (estimate: −0.32, CI −0.53 to −0.11; Table 4;
Fig. 1a). As with dictator donations, older participants
made higher Ultimatum Game offers (estimate: 0.34,
CI 0.11–0.56) but we detected no meaningful effects
of gender or game order on offer (Table 4). There
was no effect of failing a comprehension check on
Ultimatum Game offers so we did not conduct further
analyses where failed comprehenders were excluded.
P7: Paranoia will be positively associated with tendency to
reject at least one Ultimatum Game offer
There was no meaningful effect of paranoia on ten-
dency to reject at least one offer in the Ultimatum
Game (estimate: 0.01, CI −0.13 to 0.15; online Supple-
mentary Table S2). Men (estimate: 0.35, CI 0.08–0.62),
and participants that played the Ultimatum Game
ﬁrst (online Supplementary Table S2), were more likely
to reject at least one offer. By contrast, older partici-
pants and failed comprehenders were less likely to
Table 1. Factors affecting punishment threshold
Parameter Estimate Unconditional S.E. Conﬁdence interval Relative importance
Intercept 1|2 −3.96 0.36 (−4.67 to −3.25)
Intercept 2|3 −3.70 0.36 (−4.41 to −3.01)
Intercept 3|4 −2.82 0.35 (−3.51 to −2.15)
Intercept 4|5 −1.79 0.34 (−2.45 to −1.13)
Intercept 5|6 −1.18 0.33 (−1.83 to −0.53)
Intercept 6|7 −0.18 0.33 (−0.84 to 0.47)
Gender (female = 0) 0.36 0.14 (0.09 to 0.63) 1.00
Incorrect (all correct = 0) −1.95 0.28 (−2.50 to −1.40) 1.00
Age −0.74 0.15 (−1.03 to −0.46) 1.00
Paranoia −0.86 0.15 (−1.16 to −0.57) 1.00
Order (DG ﬁrst = 0) −0.02 0.08 (−0.18 to 0.14) 0.29
Punishment threshold was parameterised as a 7-level ordinal categorical variable, where lower levels indicate increased
willingness to punish higher DG offers. For binary input variables, the reference category is given in parentheses. All continu-
ous input variables were standardized and binary input variables were centred. Thus, estimates can be interpreted as being
on the same scale. Importance is the probability that the term in question is a component of the true best model.
Table 2. Factors affecting minimal acceptable offer (MAO) in the Ultimatum Game
Parameter Estimate Unconditional S.E. Conﬁdence interval Relative importance
Intercept 1|2 −1.38 0.16 (−1.70 to −1.07)
Intercept 2|3 −0.21 0.16 (−0.51 to 0.10)
Intercept 3|4 0.28 0.16 (−0.02 to 0.59)
Intercept 4|5 0.73 0.16 (0.42 to 1.03)
Intercept 5|6 1.89 0.16 (1.57 to 2.21)
Intercept 6|7 4.61 0.28 (4.06 to 5.15)
Gender (female = 0) 0.24 0.09 (0.06 to 0.41) 1.00
Incorrect (all correct = 0) −0.49 0.21 (−0.91 to −0.08) 1.00
Order (DG ﬁrst = 0) 0.48 0.21 (0.30 to 0.66) 1.00
Paranoia 0.15 0.11 (−0.07 to 0.37) 0.82
Wave (wave 1 = 0) 0.01 0.05 (−0.08 to 0.11) 0.20
Age 0.00 0.04 (−0.07 to 0.08) 0.17
MAO was parameterised as a 7-level ordinal categorical variable, where higher levels indicate increased willingness to reject
UG offers. For binary input variables, the reference category is given in parentheses. All continuous input variables were stan-
dardized and binary input variables were centred. Thus, estimates can be interpreted as being on the same scale. Importance
is the probability that the term in question is a component of the true best model.
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reject at least one offer (online Supplementary
Table S2). Excluding failed comprehenders from this
model does not qualitatively affect the results.
Exploratory analysis results
P8: We do not know whether participants will be more
willing to reject Ultimatum Game offers than they are to
punish Dictator Game donations
Participants were more willing to punish dictator
donations than they were to reject Ultimatum Game
offers of the same proportional value (Wilcoxon signed
rank test, V = 100 950, p = 0.03). Speciﬁcally, the average
maximum dictator donation that was punished was
$0.16 (30 ± 1% of the stake), whereas the mean max-
imum Ultimatum Game rejection was $0.13 (25 ± 1%
of the stake).
Unplanned analysis results
Punishment decisions were signiﬁcantly mediated by a
tendency to make harmful intent attributions although
there was also a direct effect of paranoia. See online
Supplementary Information for all details.
Table 3. Factors affecting Dictator Game offer
Parameter Estimate Unconditional S.E. Conﬁdence interval Relative importance
Intercept 1|2 −0.22 0.22 (−0.66 to 0.22)
Intercept 2|3 0.10 0.22 (−0.34 to 0.54)
Intercept 3|4 0.27 0.22 (−0.17 to 0.71)
Intercept 4|5 0.53 0.23 (−0.09 to 0.98)
Intercept 5|6 0.79 0.23 (0.35 to 1.23)
Intercept 6|7 4.64 0.31 (4.03 to 5.26)
Gender (female = 0) −0.37 0.10 (−0.56 to −0.18) 1.00
Incorrect (all correct = 0) 0.89 0.27 (0.36 to 1.43) 1.00
Order (DG ﬁrst = 0) −0.20 0.10 (−0.39 to −0.02) 1.00
Age 0.40 0.10 (0.20 to 0.59) 1.00
Paranoia −0.29 0.10 (−0.49 to −0.10) 1.00
Wave (1st wave = 0) −0.03 0.07 (−0.17 to 0.11) 0.34
DG offer was parameterised as a 7-level ordinal categorical variable. For binary input variables, the reference category is
given in parentheses. All continuous input variables were standardized and binary input variables were centred. Thus, esti-
mates can be interpreted as being on the same scale. Importance is the probability that the term in question is a component of
the true best model.
Table 4. Factors affecting Ultimatum Game offer
Parameter Estimate Unconditional S.E. Conﬁdence interval Relative importance
Intercept 1|2 −2.43 0.26 (−2.93 to −1.92)
Intercept 2|3 −2.22 0.26 (−2.72 to −1.71)
Intercept 3|4 −1.77 0.25 (−2.26 to −1.27)
Intercept 4|5 −1.36 0.25 (−1.85 to −0.87)
Intercept 5|6 −0.50 0.25 (−0.98 to −0.02)
Intercept 6|7 4.43 0.33 (3.79 to 5.07)
Age 0.34 0.11 (0.11 to 0.56) 1.00
Paranoia −0.32 0.11 (−0.53 to −0.11) 1.00
Gender (female = 0) −0.02 0.07 (−0.15 to 0.11) 0.26
Incorrect (all correct = 0) −0.05 0.17 (−0.38 to 0.28) 0.24
UG offer was parameterised as a 7-level ordinal categorical variable. For binary input variables, the reference category is
given in parentheses. All continuous input variables were standardised and binary input variables were centred. Thus, esti-
mates can be interpreted as being on the same scale. Importance is the probability that the term in question is a component of
the true best model.
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Discussion
We used a large, non-clinical sample to explore the
association between paranoia and (i) cooperation and
(ii) willingness to punish in social interactions.
Paranoia and cooperative behaviour
Previous work has suggested that reduced cooperation
in paranoia could be explained by distrust (Fett et al.
2012; Ellett et al. 2013; Gromann et al. 2013; although
see Fett et al. 2016). Our ﬁndings suggest that distrust
might not be the sole explanation, as we found that
paranoia predicted lower generosity in the Dictator
Game, where trust is not a strategic consideration.
Moreover, in the Ultimatum Game – where distrust
should predict higher offers – we found that paranoia
was unexpectedly associated with lower offers. Our
results suggest that reduced cooperation in paranoia
reﬂects increased self-interest. Importantly, self-interest
here is used in the economic sense of maximising indi-
vidual payoffs (rather than the everyday sense suggest-
ing ‘selﬁshness’).
Paranoia and punitive behaviour
We expected that paranoia would positively predict
punitive tendency. Our data mostly support our pre-
dictions: paranoia positively predicted the tendency
to punish at all in the Dictator Game, and to punish
more generous donations. Moreover, in an unplanned
mediation analysis, the effect of paranoia on willing-
ness to punish dictator donations was mediated by a
tendency to attribute harmful intentions, along with
a direct effect of paranoia.
In the Ultimatum Game, paranoia only reliably pre-
dicted punitive tendency when participants that failed
at least one comprehension check were excluded from
the analyses. Furthermore, unlike the Dictator Game,
the tendency to reject at least one offer in the
Ultimatum Game was not predicted by paranoia.
This discrepancy in the results might stem from
the fact that rejecting any offer over $0.05 in the
Ultimatum Game was costlier than punishing in the
Dictator Game (which cost $0.05 regardless of the dic-
tator’s donation). Moreover, the fee to ﬁne ratio of pun-
ishment was always 1:3 in the Dictator Game but was
variable in the Ultimatum Game from 1:9 (in the case
where responders rejected an offer of $0.05) to 1:1 (in
the case where responders rejected an offer of $0.25).
These differences in the cost of punishing and the
potential efﬁcacy of punishment across the two
games might help explain the ﬁnding that players
were more willing to punish dictator donations than
to reject Ultimatum Game offers, and might also
have reduced the size of any effect of paranoia on
Ultimatum Game rejections.
Implications for theories of paranoia
Our results suggest that the pattern of reduced cooper-
ation in paranoia better reﬂects self-interest rather
than distrust. Importantly, self-interest is a proximal
motivation and various other processes may underlie
it. For example, maximising immediate payoffs can
manifest as being less willing to invest in social inter-
actions (Stevens & Hauser, 2004) and may be an adap-
tive strategy when living in environments where
resource availability is scarce and/or unpredictable
(Frankenhuis et al. 2016). The fact that paranoia is asso-
ciated with a history of serious adverse life events
(Cristóbal-Narváez et al. 2016) would support this
explanation. Alternatively, Andreoni (1990) and
Gromann et al. (2013) have suggested that reduced
cooperation in paranoia may result from reduced sub-
jective rewards from social interactions. These explana-
tions are not mutually exclusive. Previous research has
suggested that adverse life events raise the risk of
reward system dysregulation later in life (review in
Howes & Murray, 2014) suggesting a potential prox-
imal mechanism for the impact of distal developmental
experiences. On the basis of non-clinical studies, Fehr
& Schmidt (1999) have argued that altered fairness pre-
ferences can be drivers of reduced cooperation and this
is a plausible but yet unexplored approach to paranoia.
The mediation analysis showed that the tendency to
attribute harmful intent to partners, as measured on a
previous task, was a factor motivating punishment
decisions, alongside a direct effect of paranoia. It is
possible that punitive behaviour in this study reﬂected
increased levels of hostility (Coid et al. 2016). However,
it is important to note that punishment as conceptua-
lised here does not necessarily imply anti-social or
aggressive tendencies. Indeed, willingness to invest
in punishment can provide beneﬁts in the form of
increased within-group cooperation (Yamagishi, 1986)
and we note that the factors that encourage punitive
behaviour are likely to vary across different scenarios
(see Raihani & McAuliffe, 2012; Bone & Raihani,
2015; Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Krasnow et al. 2016).
Freeman & Garety (2014) conceptualise paranoia as
being maintained by a feedback loop of behaviour,
interpretation and emotion, suggesting a dynamic sys-
tem in which different motivations may apply depend-
ing on the incentive structure of speciﬁc situations. We
found reduced cooperation and increased punitive
behaviour in paranoia but suggest that the motivations
are likely to be different in each case. We suggest here
that models of paranoia need to include not only com-
mon factors but also the dynamics and contextual
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modiﬁers of social situations to fully understand how
paranoia manifests in social behaviour. Considering
that negative social interactions are themselves likely
to act as maintaining factors for paranoia, identifying
these cycles of maintenance may be important for iden-
tifying points of intervention.
Limitations
The GPTS asks about paranoid ideation over the prior
month and participants completed the experimental
tasks in the subsequent weeks. It is possible that levels
of paranoid thinking may have altered during this
time, although given the good test-retest reliability of
the measure (Green et al. 2008), we presume this effect
would be small. Additionally, we recruited our sample
from an online platform. Previous research has shown
that online participants do not produce systematically
different responses to other participants (Horton et al.
2011; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014; Hauser & Schwarz,
2016; Arechar et al. 2017). The current study supports
this position. The mean and distribution of GPTS
scores closely reﬂect ﬁndings from the original Green
et al. (2008) validation study. Dictator Game donations
were 23.6% of the stake compared with the mean of
28% reported in the Engel (2011) meta-analysis, and
mean Ultimatum Game offers were 42%, compared
with previously reported values of 30–40% (Camerer,
2003). Although stake sizes on MTurk are often smaller
than those used in the laboratory, they are designed to
reﬂect similar hourly rates of pay. Moreover, stake size
has been found not to signiﬁcantly affect behaviour in
the Dictator Game or the Ultimatum Game (Camerer,
2003; Raihani et al. 2013). Although participants
recruited online tend to be more representative than
student samples or community samples from college
towns (Buhrmester et al. 2011), online samples also
tend to be younger, less-likely to report full-time
employment, and more likely to experience social anx-
iety than the general population (Chandler & Shapiro,
2016) and this needs to be borne in mind when inter-
preting these results.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be
found at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291717003075
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